An unexpected contact on the professional network. An offer of work from a headhunter, probably a young woman, based in China. The opportunity to earn around £20,000 on the side preparing a handful of political reports for a firm from China containing confidential or privileged insights. Payment in cryptocurrency or cash preferred.
It might appear clear, in this scenario, that something about this method would be suspicious. Nevertheless, China’s powerful Ministry of State Security still considers it valuable to deploy headhunters to try it – leading the domestic spy agency to issue multiple warnings about their operations on the internet.
Massive Approaches on Social Media
Last year, the head of MI5 Ken McCallum stated operatives from China were contacting UK citizens on LinkedIn on an extraordinary level, at a rate of 10,000 over the preceding two and a half years, attempting to obtain governmental, commercial, military and technological secrets. But a fresh campaign aimed at politicians and parliament has prompted the intelligence service to act again.
An espionage warning was issued on this week via the administrative teams of the Commons speaker and his House of Lords equivalent: a single slide after the persistent attempts of Shirly Shen and other operatives to reach out to MPs, lords, their staffers, economists, thinktanks – anyone who might become a source.
Security Approach and Legal Changes
In the curious manner of British intelligence, there was no publication of the security advice from MI5 or the interior ministry. But the agency knew its advisory document would leak once it was emailed out to Westminster. Republishing it in the press assists the wider public more easily recognize communications with a deceptive intent.
This warning has the effect of uncovering additional details from within Westminster, though that is not MI5’s main objective. The agency wants people in public life to understand that just because interactions on LinkedIn are not as toxic as on other social platforms, it does not mean they are completely safe.
Additionally, the internal security service understood to have been reacting to a particular event in the legislature, though the recent actions occur after the awkward failure of the legal case of a ex-assistant an individual and his friend Christopher Berry on a technicality in recent months.
Both individuals had been accused of working for the foreign power – a charge they denied – but inability to complete a trial under the now repealed previous legislation led to warnings that British democracy had been left unprotected.
Revised Legislation and Beijing's Strategic Interests
Legislation has since been updated, and the security briefing includes a note of its successor: “Those engaging in spying operations face substantial legal consequences under the National Security Act.” This constitutes a criminal offense if a person engages in behavior that is or is likely to “materially assist a foreign intelligence service”.
A natural question, though, is what China has to achieve. An elected representative who is not a government minister will have limited knowledge of sensitive information, and an contact of theirs less so. Yet Beijing is particularly focused in parliament: for a period, in 2020 and 2021, the UK’s approach to China on matters such as the telecom firm or the human rights situation or genocide was being influenced by parliamentarians.
Cultural Variations and Persistent Cyber Threats
To a degree there are cultural differences too. Authoritarian governments like China’s export information gathering methods and the scale of its intelligence apparatus is enormous, engaging 300,000 individuals. Chris Inglis, a American cybersecurity head under president Joe Biden, said it was occasionally assessed that “the Chinese have more English speakers engaged in this than Western agencies have English speakers”.
The Chinese government is prepared to cultivate contacts over the long term and at times even the intelligence services have struggled to differentiate legitimate relationships and espionage. “China has a low threshold for what information is considered to be useful,” security minister a government official informed MPs on Wednesday, but a sudden turn in the government situation may mean an individual quickly peripheral turning important.
Another way to think about the continuous efforts at covert intelligence collection is in the broader framework of the geopolitical contest between Beijing and the Western nations at a level below the level of direct conflict. The nation has increased its cyber operations, with the one campaign infiltration of communications systems in 80 countries, and the Volt Typhoon compromise of millions internet devices.
Beijing is involved in relentless attempts to find covert sources on UK politics online because it wants to be provocative, to demonstrate influence and because it can.
